This analysis examines how former president Ashraf Ghani’s personal choices interacted with deep structural constraints and the external shock of U.S. withdrawal, accelerating the speed and shaping the manner of the Republic’s fall. The central argument is that the loss of vital external support and a chronic legitimacy crisis were necessary conditions for the collapse, but Ghani’s governing style and decisions played a decisive role in hastening and defining the outcome.
A Turning Point After the Doha Agreement
The stage shifted on February 29, 2020, when the Doha Agreement excluded the Afghan government from direct negotiations. On the ground, the dominant perception became that the Taliban was a “government-in-waiting.” The prolonged electoral crisis that same year — lasting over five months — followed by parallel inaugurations on March 9 and the political settlement of May 17, 2020, deepened elite fractures and eroded public trust.
In this environment, resisting the external pressure required three pillars: broad, horizontal coalition-building with local actors; stability in the security command chain; and a credible transition plan to keep the cost of surrender high for local commanders.
Ghani’s Centralized Style and Narrow Consultations
Ghani’s governance rested on heavy centralization and reliance on a small inner circle of technocrats and security officials, sidelining intermediaries and provincial powerbrokers. In a system where politics flowed through local networks, their exclusion weakened the sense of ownership over the Republic. When district collapses accelerated in mid-2021, these weakened ties became evident: many local figures had little incentive to resist as their connection to Kabul had already frayed.
Rejection of Transition Models
Post-Doha, Ghani rejected proposals for a time-bound transition or interim government, insisting instead on Taliban integration into the existing republic framework. This stance limited the Republic’s bargaining flexibility and allowed the Taliban’s incremental strategy — cutting rural and border lifelines, encircling districts, and sealing local surrender deals — to steadily lower the cost of defection. Without a credible transition framework from Kabul, many local commanders began envisioning their future outside the presidential palace’s authority.
Security Sector Turbulence
Spring and summer 2021 saw repeated changes in key security posts — precisely when stability and cohesion were most needed. Meanwhile, U.S. drawdown announcements signaled the looming loss of the maintenance and mobility infrastructure on which the Afghan forces had been designed to rely. Built for high-mobility operations with close air and technical support, the forces were left with “active defense” doctrine but without the offensive initiative to match it. Messaging from the top failed to deliver a consistent, credible operational direction, further eroding morale.
Narrative Mismatch
Official assurances of full readiness and denial of imminent collapse clashed with reports from the frontlines. This disconnect delayed political and military adaptation, undermining Kabul’s credibility with mid-tier leaders. When several provincial capitals fell without significant fighting, the domino effect was driven as much by collapsing expectations of the center’s will and capacity as by Taliban battlefield superiority.
The Final Decision — August 15, 2021
Ghani’s departure from Kabul, framed as a move to “prevent bloodshed,” created a vacuum in command that transformed a military collapse into an administrative and psychological one. Staying might not have changed the strategic outcome, but it could have altered the form of the end: enabling an orderly evacuation, a managed transfer, and a coherent message to prevent total institutional disintegration.
Structural Context
It is important to situate Ghani’s role within the wider constraints. Without the loss of vital external support and the perception shift triggered by the Doha Agreement, such rapid collapse would have been unlikely. Chronic corruption, a rentier economy, and legitimacy crises — visibly reinforced by the 2020 electoral dispute and its contested inaugurations — had already weakened the Republic’s foundations before summer 2021. Ghani’s choices acted as accelerants: centralization over coalition-building, resistance to transition frameworks, late-stage security reshuffles, narrative-field mismatches, and the August 15 decision.
Lessons for Future Governance
The August 15 case carries three policy lessons:
- In multi-layered political systems, institutionalized horizontal coalitions with local actors are essential.
- Security design must minimize external dependency and have actionable contingency plans for reduced support.
- Crisis transition mechanisms must be in place before a breakdown, to keep the cost of surrender high for political and security mid-tiers.
Without these reforms, even a future Afghan government backed by external support will remain fragile in the face of similar shocks.
