The collapse of the Republic in Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, was not the result of a single cause. It was the culmination of multiple, overlapping forces: the shift in the international equation after the Doha Agreement and the withdrawal of critical external support; structural weaknesses in the post-2001 state-building process — including over-centralization, systemic corruption, legitimacy crises, and elite fragmentation; and the Taliban’s operational and psychological strategy of gradual encirclement paired with negotiated local surrenders. Viewed through a multi-layered lens, the “moment of collapse” was less the start of defeat than the point at which accumulated failures converged.
International Level — Changing Expectations and the Erosion of Support
The Doha Agreement of February 29, 2020, reshaped perceptions. Excluding the Afghan government from the main talks and setting a clear withdrawal timeline fostered the belief — both among the public and the elite — that the Taliban was a “government-in-waiting” and the Republic a “project nearing its end.” In conflict theory, shifts in expectations can be as decisive as changes in the balance of power: when local actors see the future as predetermined, the will to resist fades and the incentive to cut deals grows.
Withdrawal was not just the departure of troops. The sudden loss of contractors, maintenance networks, and intelligence and air-support capabilities — the backbone of the security forces — crippled mobility and morale. The release of thousands of Taliban prisoners further strengthened the group’s manpower and sense of momentum.
State Level — Long-Term Weaknesses and Short-Term Missteps
Post-2001 state-building was marked by extreme centralization, patronage-driven politics, and disputed elections. Rather than building a durable national coalition, this system relied on fragile, personal loyalties. As a result, the government lacked the social capital to mobilize broad resistance against the Taliban, especially in areas where it failed to provide justice or meaningful services.
Leadership instability, elite infighting, and overreliance on narrow circles undermined both battlefield and negotiation leverage. A recurring miscalculation — disbelief in a complete, rapid U.S. withdrawal — delayed painful but necessary institutional and political mobilization.
Security forces were optimized for a high-mobility fight with close foreign air and intelligence support, not for independent, long-term defense. When “active defense” replaced offensive initiative, the crucial element of “seizing the initiative” in insurgent warfare was lost, and forces became more static, holding positions rather than breaking sieges.
Operational Level — Gradual Encirclement and Collapse via Agreements
From mid-2020, the Taliban refined a step-by-step advance: first seizing rural and border arteries to choke supply lines, then surrounding district centers, and finally targeting provincial capitals. The real key, however, was not sheer military superiority, but a web of local agreements with power brokers, commanders, and mediators. Promises of safety, positions, or simply acceptance of the inevitable made resistance seem futile.
Psychological warfare was constant: choreographed military displays, publicized surrender lists, and a “preordained end” narrative eroded defenders’ morale. Once several provincial capitals fell without major fighting, the domino effect of defections accelerated, culminating in Kabul’s capture without an urban battle.
Regional Dimension — External Depth and Cross-Border Networks
Afghanistan’s geography ensured the conflict was never purely domestic. External sanctuaries, cross-border supply chains, and the shadow economy — from fuel to narcotics — sustained the Taliban’s resources in ways an isolated insurgency could not. Regional actors’ calculations, from Pakistan to Iran, China, Russia, and Gulf states, constrained Kabul’s maneuvering space. Even amid contested narratives about the scale of outside support, analysts agree: without external depth, local communities and elites might have faced far lower costs in resisting the Taliban, making surrenders less likely.
Analysis — Necessary vs. Sufficient Causes
The loss of critical external support was a necessary condition for the Republic’s collapse, but not sufficient on its own. With greater political legitimacy, a broader coalition, and more self-reliant security institutions, the state might have slowed the process or negotiated a different settlement. Conversely, structural weaknesses alone might not have caused such a rapid collapse without the external shock. It was the alignment of Taliban encirclement strategy with reduced foreign support and eroded internal legitimacy that proved decisive.
Conclusion
The fall of Ashraf Ghani’s government was the combined outcome of three forces: shifting international expectations and withdrawal of support; institutional fragility and elite disunity; and the Taliban’s operational-psychological momentum. In this view, August 15, 2021, was not an abrupt, isolated event, but the due date for long-standing, unaddressed vulnerabilities. Any future stabilization model in Afghanistan will remain fragile unless it rebuilds political legitimacy, decentralizes ineffective governance, boosts institutional-security self-sufficiency, and addresses the regional dimension with clear, sustainable strategies.
